Humans are sensitive to others' possessions, such as talents, appearance, achievements, etc. By comparing ourselves to others, we assess self-evaluation and personal satisfaction. Here, reviewing recent neuroscientific findings, we will illustrate the neural mechanisms of emotional reactions to the perceived inequity of social comparison by both the level of contextual appraisal and the automatic level of perceiving the emotions of others. Envy, schadenfreude, empathy and counterempathy are predominant emotions associated with social comparison, and the brain is predisposed to generating them according to others' conditions. It is argued that happiness is not just a pure hedonic state but is a matter of others, whose happiness cannot exceed ones own.
comparison in the central processing of these emotions. We then illustrate in detail how the brain processes emotional reactions expressed by others, with a primary focus on empathy and counter-empathy, which represent a dynamic social interaction in our living world.
ENVY AND SCHADENFREUDE
When the possessions of another are superior, we feel envy. Envy is an irrational, unpleasant and painful emotion (Aristotle, 1981) . When envy is evoked, we often have a desire to possess the same advantage or may wish that the other loses it (Parrott & Smith, 1993) . When misfortune occurs to others, emotions can manifest themselves in several ways. We have feelings of concern and sorrow for the other person (Eisenberg, 2007; Singer et al., 2004 ), but we can also experience schadenfreude, a rewarding feeling derived from another's misfortune (Heider, 1958) . Schadenfreude is closely related to envy, and it is more likely to arise when misfortune happens to a person who is advantaged and self-relevant than to someone who is neither advantaged nor self-relevant (Heider, 1958; de Spinoza, 2006; van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006) .
We investigated the brain activation associated with envy and schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009) . Nineteen healthy volunteers participated in two series of fMRI studies. In the first study, we measured brain activation related to envy toward someone who has superior possessions. In the second study, we analyzed brain activations associated with schadenfreude toward misfortunate events happening to the envied person in study one.
Each participant was presented with a scenario in which the protagonist and other characters appeared and was asked to imagine the protagonist of the scenario as himself/ herself. In the scenario, the protagonist was average in terms of possessions such as ability, quality, and social status. One of the characters shared similar attributes with the protagonist but possessed superior quality and ability in study one. Misfortunate events happened to this target character in the scenario of study two. After the above two scans, the participants rated the level of felt envy toward the target character, and the level of felt pleasure in response to misfortunes toward the envied character. Behaviorally, self-rating scores of envy for the target character were positively correlated with the magnitude of schadenfreude for the same target (correlation coefficient r = 0.50, P = 0.03).
Envious condition in study one produced activations in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), a region implicated in the processing of conflict or pain (Fig. 1A) . In study two, misfortunate events recruited activations in the reward-related regions in the ventral striatum (Fig. 1B) .
ACC activation in response to envy might reflect a painful feature of this emotion. Activation in this region has been reported in response to social pain (distress of social exclusion) (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003) . Taken together, envy might be a social pain in the self, with feelings of being excluded from the field that one is concerned with.
We are usually motivated to maintain a positive self-concept (Tesser, 1988) , and we feel discomfort when our self-concept is threatened by others who outperform ourselves in a self-relevant domain. Considering the role of dACC in conflict-monitoring (Kerns et al., 2004) , the association between envy and dACC activation suggests that envy is a condition in which information recognized by social comparison conflicts with positive self-concept. Experiencing discomfort motivates us to reduce it. Discomfort arising from others outperforming us in our cherished domains can be resolved by reducing the relevance of the domain to us or changing relative performance (Tesser, 1988) . From an economic perspective, envy has productive and destructive effects on economic growth. It motivates the members in organizations to enhance their own performances or to sabotage their opponents' performances (Lazear, 1989) . When misfortune occurs to an advantaged person and contributes to narrowing the gap of relative performance in an important domain, discomfort or pain is reduced, and a pleasant feeling is induced. This pleasure at another's misfortune is correspondent to the activation of the ventral striatum (McClure, York, & Montague, 2004; Fehr & Camerer, 2007) . The striatum has also been implicated in altruistic punishment (de Quervain et al., 2004) and observing an unfair person receiving pain (Singer et al., 2006) . Stronger dACC activation induced by the envied other in study one predicted stronger ventral striatum activation when misfortunes occurred to this person in study two. This means that people who tend to have higher pain or conflict are more likely to have a strong pleasant feeling once they are relieved from this pain. Thus, these findings propose a neurocognitive mechanism of a psychologically rewarding reaction, schadenfreude, and its relation to envy. At the same time, ventral striatum activation without receiving an actual reward indicates that we did not evaluate objects solely by their absolute value but that social comparison plays a substantial role in the evaluation (Fliessbach et al., 2007) . 
EMPATHY AND COUNTER-EMPATHY
The biological predisposition to resonate emotionally with another person, called "empathy", is regarded as a critical aspect of social interaction. Shared neural circuits activated during affective experiences in oneself and their observation in others indicate our propensity to resonate emotionally with others (Decety, 2011) . However, situations in which social comparison is significant, like in a competition, game, war, etc., the emotional response to others can be incongruent, or even opposed to the emotional state of the other. This discrepant emotional response has been called "counter-empathy".
As described in the previous section, misfortunes of envied others recruited neural responses in reward-related areas, but no activation in empathy-related areas (ACC and anterior insula) was found (Takahashi et al., 2009) . Similarly, a lack of empathy-related brain responses was reported when painful stimulus was administered to an unfair person in a game (Singer et al., 2006) and when a rival football team lost a game (Cikara, Botvinick, & Fiske, 2011) . Although these findings reveal the top-down process of reacting to the contextual appraisals of competitive situations, it remains unclear how the automatic, sensory-driven process of reacting to another person's emotional expression is modulated in terms of neural responses.
We investigated empathic and counter-empathic evoked neural responses to another person's facial expressions in an ecologically valid social interaction (Yamada, Lamm, & Decety, 2011) . Given that neural responses to facial expressions occur within the first 300 ms after stimulus onset, we employed high-resolution event-related brain potential (ERP) recordings to monitor these early-onset neural responses. Our analyses focused on two distinct ERP components: the neural encoding of facial expressions (N170) and the detection of errors performed by oneself or another person (medial frontal negativity, MFN). A recent study demonstrated a relationship between the magnitude of N170 and the occurrence of spontaneous facial mimicry (Achaïbou, Pourtois, Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2008) , and a competitive situation promoted asymmetrical-i.e., counterempathic-responses of facial mimicry (Englis & Vaughan, 1982) . MFN, on the other hand, is sensitive to an unfavorable outcome for self (Yeung & Sanfey, 2004) , for both favorable and unfavorable outcomes (Jung et al., 2010) , or for others (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; Koban, Pourtois, Vocat, & Vuilleumier, 2010) . MFN is usually observed between 200-400 ms after stimulus onset, and its neural source is considered to be in ACC (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004) or in the medial cingulate cortex (MCC) (Vogt, 2005) .
Participants played a card game under the belief that they were playing jointly with another player who sat in an adjoining room and whose smiles and frowns in response to winning or losing in the game they could observe on a computer screen (Yamada et al., 2011) . Depending upon the experimental setting, the other player's facial expressions conveyed either of two opposing values to the participant. In the empathic setting, his emotional expressions were congruent with the participant's outcome (win or loss), whereas in the counter-empathic setting, they indicated incongruent outcomes (Fig. 2) .
Results revealed a reversed pattern of brain responses to facial expressions between congruent and incongruent conditions at approximately 170 ms (N170) over the temporal cortex (Fig. 3) . That is, N170 was sensitive to frowns in the congruent condition and to smiles in the incongruent condition, both indicating losses for the participant. Furthermore, frowns in the incongruent condition yielded larger MFN over the medial prefrontal cortex (Fig. 4) , which correlated with the subjective pleasantness about one's own winning in the incongruent condition (spearman r = -0.82, p < 0.001) (Fig. 5) . Earlier work on counter-empathy showed a reversed pattern of facial mimicry in competitive and non-competitive settings (Englis & Vaughan, 1982) . Considering that mimicry to emotional faces was found to modulate N170 (Achaïbou et al., 2008) , the reversed pattern of N170 between congruent and incongruent conditions in our study demonstrates contextual influences on early sensory processing of facial expressions. Furthermore, N170 amplitude was associated with one's own negative outcome rather than emotional states of the co-player. This indicates egoistic emotional processing of facial expressions, whatever the emotional states of others. Thus, when the situation is competitive, emotional facial expressions might be processed automatically and preferentially in association with one's own affective values. A similar egocentric negative emotional influence on N170 amplitude was observed in the domain of verbal information processing and social categorization (Montalan et al., 2008) .
In previous two-player gambling games, MFN was elicited by the sight of the opponent's loss not only in a cooperative situation but also when the opponent's loss was beneficial to the observer (Fukushima & Hiraki, 2006; Koban et al., 2010) . A recent fMRI study found that activation in the medial frontal cortex was also enhanced for errors when an observed error resulted in a gain for the participant (De Bruijn, de Lange, Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2009 ). The larger MFN amplitudes for frowns in the incongruent condition (representing positive inequity), which signaled "gain" for the self and "loss" for the other, are in line with these findings. Notably, the examination of post-experimental subjective feelings about one's own outcome revealed that the magnitude of MFN observed during positive inequity was associated with a pleasant feeling, the experience of schadenfreude. 
CONCLUSION
In this review, we have described the following findings.
In the first study, 1) strong dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) activation was observed when one felt envy. 2) Striatal activation was observed when misfortune happened to an envied person. 3) dACC activation and striatal activation were correlated. In the second study, 4) counter-empathic responses were associated with modulation of early sensory processing of emotional faces. 5) Medial frontal negativity (MFN) over the medial prefrontal cortex was sensitive to the detection of another person's error during positive inequity. 6) MFN was associated with a feeling of pleasure, schadenfreude. Together, these findings argue for a strong malleability of affective responses to the perceived inequity of social comparison by both the level of contextual appraisal and the automatic level of perceiving the emotions of others. Inequity triggers envy for the situation and counter-empathy to the emotions of others. These emotions further influence our affective responses when the situation turns to positive inequity. The experience of schadenfreude is generated by both controlled and automatic processes, suggesting that our satisfaction, subjective well-being, and happiness are not just pure hedonic states but a matter of others who provide us with a reference point. Considering that the social interaction is ongoing and individuals are referring to each other, it may be interesting to discover how the emotional reactions, like schadenfreude, would evolve and be optimized, in future investigations.
